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RETHINK “PERSONAL”:  
AT&T AND THE GRAMMAR  
CLAMOR AT THE COURT 
Justin Dickerson* 
Are corporations people, too? Several recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions have considered whether constitutional protections that are 
typically reserved for individuals also extend to corporations. While 
corporations are considered “persons” in a legal sense, a unanimous 
Court decided in FCC v. AT&T that this legal fiction does not entitle 
corporations to “personal” privacy rights under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). Without delving into more controversial 
constitutional questions, Chief Justice Roberts reached this conclusion 
largely by analyzing the ordinary and legal usages of the words 
“person” and “personal.” This Comment examines the Court’s ruling 
and argues that while the Court answered a specific question regarding 
a corporation’s privacy rights in the context of FOIA, it missed a 
valuable opportunity to further clarify how constitutional rights apply 
to corporations. Indeed, despite the Court’s holding in FCC v. AT&T, 
more challenges to the idea of corporate personhood will likely follow. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or the “Act”) requires 
federal agencies to make records and documents publicly available 
upon request, unless the documents fall within one of several 
statutory exemptions.1 One of these exemptions, § 552(b)(7)(C) 
(“Exemption 7(C)”), covers law-enforcement records, the disclosure 
of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”2 In FCC v. AT&T Inc.,3 AT&T argued 
that corporations such as itself have “personal privacy” rights under 
this FOIA exemption based on the common legal usage of the word 
“person” to describe corporations.4 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous U.S. Supreme 
Court, held that corporations do not have a right to personal privacy 
for purposes of Exemption 7(C).5 Much of the support for the 
Court’s holding came from standard English dictionary definitions 
and grammar.6 AT&T’s primary argument claimed that “[b]y 
expressly defining the noun ‘person’ to include corporations, 
Congress necessarily defined the adjective form of that noun—
‘personal’—also to include corporations.”7 Beyond the word’s 
standard usage in the English language, the Court also looked to the 
use of the word “personal” as it is used in the statutory context of 
Exemption 7(C),8 § 552(b)(6) (“Exemption 6”),9 and § 552(b)(4) 
(“Exemption 4”),10 as well as in the legislative history describing 
Congress’s intentions in drafting Exemption 7(C).11 In addition, the 
Court compared the language of Exemption 7(C) to the language that 
is used in other FOIA exemptions, and, more specifically, considered 
 
 1. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 2. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added). 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011). 
 4. Id. at 1180–81. 
 5. Id. at 1179, 1185. 
 6. See id. at 1181–84. 
 7. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc. at 14, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (No. 09-
1279)). 
 8. Id. at 1182. 
 9. Id. at 1184–85; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006). 
 10. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1185; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
 11. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1184. 
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whether the language of those other exemptions would apply to 
corporations.12 
This case is significant given the controversy that surrounded 
the Court’s decision during the previous term in Citizens United v. 
FEC,13 where the Court recognized that profit-making corporations 
have a broad constitutional right of free speech.14 As it did in 
Citizens United,15 the Court once again, in FCC v. AT&T, considered 
the fiction of corporate “personhood.”16 In addition, FCC v. AT&T is 
notable for what it did not decide; namely, it avoided any discussion 
of whether another core “personal” right found in the Constitution 
could also extend to corporations. 
This Comment argues that the Court missed an important 
opportunity to clarify how “personal” rights apply to corporations. 
Part II details the facts that led to the Court’s holding. Part III then 
examines AT&T’s contention that “personal” is merely the adjectival 
form of “person.” It also discusses the Court’s response, which 
explored the ordinary language and legal usages of these words and 
provided a statutory interpretation. Part IV goes on to analyze how 
the Court sidestepped a constitutional discussion by focusing on 
grammar and word definitions to reach its conclusion. This Part 
contrasts Exemption 7(C) with other exemptions within FOIA, and it 
also discusses other landmark cases that deal with the idea of 
corporate “personhood.” Finally, Part V concludes that Chief Justice 
Roberts intentionally limited his analysis to avoid dealing with larger 
constitutional questions, and that more challenges from corporate 
“persons” are likely to follow. 
II.  STATEMENT OF  
THE CASE 
AT&T participated in an FCC-administered program called the 
Education-Rate program that the FCC created to enhance schools’ 
and libraries’ access to advanced telecommunications and 
information services.17 In August 2004, “AT&T voluntarily reported 
 
 12. Id. at 1184–85. 
 13. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 14. See id. at 883. 
 15. Id. at 972. 
 16. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181–84. 
 17. Id. at 1180. 
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to the FCC that it might have overcharged the U.S. government for 
services it provided to them as part of the program.”18 In response, 
the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (the “Bureau”) launched an 
investigation of AT&T.19 As part of the Bureau’s investigation, 
“AT&T provided the Bureau with various documents, including [its] 
responses to interrogatories, invoices, e-mails with pricing and 
billing information, names and job descriptions of employees 
involved, and AT&T’s assessment of whether those employees had 
violated the company’s code of conduct.”20 The Bureau completed 
its investigation, and the FCC and AT&T resolved the matter in 
December 2004 through a consent decree in which AT&T, without 
conceding liability, agreed to pay the U.S. government $500,000 and 
institute a plan to ensure that AT&T would comply with the program 
in the future.21 
Several months after the parties entered the consent decree, 
CompTel, a “trade association representing some of AT&T’s 
competitors,” submitted a FOIA request for “[a]ll pleadings and 
correspondence” in the Bureau’s file on its investigation of AT&T.22 
AT&T opposed CompTel’s request, and the Bureau responded to 
CompTel’s request with a letter ruling.23 The Bureau concluded in its 
ruling that some of the information that AT&T had provided as part 
of the investigation (including cost and pricing data; billing-related 
information; and information that identified staff, contractors, and 
customer representatives) should be protected from disclosure under 
Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information” from disclosure.24 The Bureau also decided to 
withhold other information that CompTel requested on the basis of 
Exemption 7(C), which precludes the disclosure of “records of 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes” where such 
disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”25 Applying the terms of 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (citing AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 492–93 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
1177 (2011)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
  
Winter 2012]   FCC V. AT&T 503 
Exemption 7(C), the Bureau concluded that the individuals who were 
identified in AT&T’s submissions had “privacy rights” that 
warranted protection under Exemption 7(C).26 While the Bureau 
extended Exemption 7(C) protection to the individuals who were 
identified in AT&T’s records, the Bureau did not extend that 
exemption to the corporation itself. It reasoned that “businesses do 
not possess ‘personal privacy’ interests by the exemption.”27 
The FCC reviewed and agreed with the Bureau’s findings.28 The 
FCC disagreed with AT&T’s argument that it was a “private 
corporate citizen” with personal privacy rights that needed to be 
protected because disclosure would have “embarrass[ed]” the 
corporation.29 The FCC found AT&T’s position to be at odds with 
established FCC and judicial precedent.30 The FCC thus concluded 
that Exemption 7(C)’s protection of records that it compiled for law 
enforcement purposes—the disclosure of which could reasonably 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy—does not 
apply to corporations such as AT&T.31 
As the statute that governs review of final FCC decisions 
permits,32 AT&T sought a review of the FCC’s decision in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.33 The appellate court rejected 
the FCC’s reasoning, concluding that Exemption 7(C)’s protection of 
personal privacy rights does extend to corporations.34 While it noted 
that Congress defined the word “person” to include corporations as 
well as individuals, the Third Circuit emphasized that the full text of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which governs how federal 
administrative agencies may propose and establish regulations, states 
that the term “person” includes “an individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than 
an agency.”35 The Third Circuit found that FOIA’s text 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1180–81. 
 28. Id. at 1181. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting In re SBC Commc’ns Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 13704, 13707 (2008)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2006). 
 33. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)). 
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“unambiguously” indicates that a corporation may have a personal 
privacy interest under Exemption 7(C).36 
The FCC then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the 
Third Circuit’s decision.37 CompTel filed as a respondent supporting 
the FCC.38 The Court granted certiorari and then reversed the Third 
Circuit’s decision on March 1, 2011.39 
III.  REASONING OF  
THE COURT 
In its appeal to the Court, AT&T reiterated the Third Circuit’s 
finding that the word “personal,” as Exemption 7(C) uses it in the 
sense of “personal privacy,” is merely the adjectival form of 
“person.”40 The Court responded to this argument with a grammar 
lesson.41 The Court said that “adjectives typically reflect the meaning 
of corresponding nouns, but not always.”42 
Therefore, the Court was not persuaded by AT&T’s reasoning 
and offered several examples in support of its conclusion that 
AT&T’s asserted “grammatical imperative” does not always mean 
that Congress intended for the adjectival form of a noun to have the 
same meaning as the noun.43 Chief Justice Roberts took a 
particularly strong stance regarding this “grammatical imperative” 
during oral argument. “I tried to sit down and come up with other 
examples where the adjective was very different from the root noun,” 
the Chief Justice said. “And it turns out it’s not hard at all.”44 To the 
amusement of the audience, Chief Justice Roberts used the words 
“craft” and “crafty” and then “squirrel and “squirrely.”45 In its ruling, 
the Court also provided several examples of this grammatical rule: 
 
 36. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011). 
 37. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1177, 1181. 
 40. Id. at 1181. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. Loyola Marymount University English professor Kevin Peters agreed. “That tells 
me how vacant the cupboard was for better arguments,” he said. E-mail from Kevin J. Peters, 
Professor of English, Loyola Marymount University, to Author (Aug. 15, 2011, 17:17 PST) (on 
file with Author). Professor Peters said that it is a stretch to suggest that because a corporation is 
a person it therefore has “personal” belongings. Id. 
 44. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (No. 09-1279), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.aspx. 
 45. Id. 
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for instance, the Court pointed out that the noun “crab” refers to a 
crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” 
can refer to handwriting that is difficult to read.46 The Court intended 
for its numerous examples to show that, even where there may be a 
link between the noun and its adjective, the words will often have 
different ordinary meanings.47 Accordingly, the Court found that the 
word “personal” does not derive from the English word “person” and 
that this finding highlighted the shortcomings of AT&T’s proposed 
rule.48 
The Court then discussed the ordinary meaning of the word 
“personal.”49 The Court did this because it said that when a statute 
does not define a term such as “personal,”50 the Court will give the 
phrase its ordinary meaning.51 The Court noted that, as a matter of 
ordinary English usage, the term “personal” usually refers to 
individuals.52 “We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, 
personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or 
personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial 
entities,” the Court wrote.53 This is despite the fact that we do speak 
of corporations as “persons,” at least in the legal sense.54 While 
corporations do engage in “correspondence,” exert “influence,” and 
suffer “tragedies,” the Court observed that the term “personal” is not 
generally used to describe these characteristics.55 The Court held 
that, in ordinary usage, the term “personal” often means the opposite 
of something that is related to business, and the Court drew out the 
 
 46. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181. 
 47. Id. at 1181–82. Another example is the adjective “cranky,” meaning a person with a 
“wayward” or “capricious” temper, in comparison to the noun “crank,” which describes a 
distorted or crooked angular shape. Id. at 1182. 
 48. Id. at 1182. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The word “personal” is not in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) 
(2006). 
 51. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Johnson v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1267 (2010)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Gary Gutting, Corporations, People, and Truth, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG 
(Oct. 12, 2011, 2:19 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/corporations-people-
and-truth/ (discussing presidential hopeful Mitt Romney’s statement that “[c]orporations are 
people” and affirming that corporations are “persons” in “some technical legal sense”). 
 55. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182. 
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differences between work and personal life, work and personal 
expenses, and a company’s official view and a personal opinion.56 
To emphasize this point, the Court proposed a hypothetical: 
suppose that a “chief executive officer of a corporation approached 
the chief financial officer and said, ‘I have something personal to tell 
you.’”57 Most would not assume that the CEO was about to discuss 
company business.58 In further support, the Court then looked to 
Webster’s dictionary for help in showing that the common meaning 
of the word “personal” does not apply to corporations.59 The Court 
noted that the dictionary defines “personal” as “‘[o]f [or] pertaining 
to . . . the individual person or self,’ and ‘individual; private; one’s 
own,’ . . . ‘[o]f or pertaining to one’s person, body, or figure.’”60 The 
Court held that this could not mean corporations.61 
AT&T also argued that “person” in common legal usage was 
understood to include a corporation.62 “Personal,” AT&T argued, 
therefore can and should have the same scope when it is applied to 
corporations.63 Setting aside ordinary usage, the Court said that there 
is little support for the notion that “personal” denotes corporations in 
the legal context.64 Although AT&T had noted that corporations are 
protected by the doctrine of “personal” jurisdiction, the Court held 
that the phrase instead refers to jurisdiction in personam (as opposed 
to in rem) not to the jurisdiction “of a person.”65 
AT&T also cited an 1896 case that referred to the “personal 
privilege” of a corporation.66 But the Court found that this one case 
fell very short of establishing that “personal” has a legal meaning 
that is separate from its ordinary meaning, even if “person” has a 
legal meaning.67 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. Another example that the Court gave was where a corporation is responding to a 
request for information. Id. The Court said that an individual might respond, “That’s personal.” 
Id. By contrast, a company spokesman, when asked for information about a company, would not 
classify confidential information as “personal.” Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 726 (1933)). 
 61. Id. at 1183. 
 62. Id. at 1182. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1183. 
 65. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 7, at 19–20). 
 66. Id. (citing Mercantile Bank v. Tenn. ex. rel. Memphis, 161 U.S. 161, 171 (1896)). 
 67. Id. 
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The Court then addressed AT&T’s argument that the term 
“personal privacy” simply means the privacy of a “person” as the 
statute defines it, an assertion that placed significance on the 
meaning of the term “person” as Exemption 7(C) uses it.68 Once 
again, the Court had a number of examples to show that “two words 
together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in 
isolation.”69 As such, the phrase “personal privacy” conveys more 
than just the privacy “of a person,” the Court said.70 Instead, the 
Court found that “personal privacy” refers to a type of privacy that is 
related to human concerns and therefore not a kind of privacy that is 
usually associated with a corporation like AT&T.71 The Court noted 
that, although AT&T repeatedly made the argument that “personal 
privacy” applies to corporations, AT&T could not support that 
assertion with a single instance in which a statute, the Supreme 
Court, or any other court72 expressly referred to a corporation’s 
“personal privacy.”73 The Court cited a number of treatises that state 
the opposite—that corporations do not have personal privacy 
rights.74 
Finally, the Court concluded by establishing that its analytical 
approach was consistent with a longstanding approach to statutory 
interpretation and that the various government agencies that apply 
FOIA had long interpreted Exemption 7(C)’s personal privacy 
protections to not cover corporations.75 The Court said that shortly 
after Congress enacted the 1974 amendments that created 
Exemption 7(C), the attorney general issued a memorandum to 
executive departments and agencies in which he explained what 
“personal privacy” meant as that term was used in the context of the 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. For example, the Court said that it understands that a “golden cup” is a cup made of 
or resembling gold, but a “‘golden boy,’ on the other hand, is one who is charming, lucky, and 
talented. A ‘golden opportunity’ is one not to be missed.” Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. This did not include the Third Circuit’s holding in this case. See supra notes 33–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 73. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1183. 
 74. Id. at 1183–84 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (1976); 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 641–42 (2d ed. 1955)). 
 75. Id. at 1185. 
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new exemption.76 The attorney general explained that personal 
privacy “pertains to the privacy interests of individuals.”77 
Accordingly, the attorney general noted that the new exemption 
“does not seem applicable to corporations or other entities.”78 The 
Court said that it had previously relied on the attorney general’s 
memorandum as a “reliable guide in interpreting [the language of] 
FOIA” and that it agreed with the memorandum’s interpretation of 
the language of Exemption 7(C).79 The Court reversed the Third 
Circuit’s judgment that Exemption 7(C)’s “personal privacy” 
protection extends to corporations.80 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
FCC v. AT&T continues the debate over the nature and extent of 
a corporation’s “personhood.” However, the Court’s opinion sheds 
little light on the fundamental question of just how much of a 
“person” a corporation is. In addition, this decision is hard to 
reconcile with Citizens United; the Citizens United Court was willing 
to give a corporation the rights of a “person” in the context of the 
First Amendment, but this Court was unwilling to recognize that a 
corporation as a “person” has “personal privacy” rights.81 
Unfortunately, after the decision in FCC v. AT&T, a corporation 
as a “person” becomes an even more muddled legal construct. This is 
because Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in FCC v. AT&T studiously 
avoided tackling the larger issue of corporate “personhood” and its 
constitutional implications: “[T]his case does not call [for the Court] 
to pass on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter 
of constitutional or common law.”82 But that is not necessarily the 
case. Aside from the fact that the Court could have provided more 
guidance if it had tackled these issues, the case actually raises more 
questions about what, if any, “personal” protections a corporation 
 
 76. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 9 (1975), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/74agmemo.htm). 
 77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1185–86. 
 81. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Corporate “Personhood”—Again, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 18, 2011, 11:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=112301. 
 82. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1184. 
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deserves. The Court only chose to answer a specific question 
regarding a corporation’s privacy rights in the context of FOIA, and 
missed a valuable opportunity to further clarify how constitutional 
rights apply to corporations. 
To avoid discussing these issues, Chief Justice Roberts focused 
on the grammatical structure of Exemption 7(C)’s language as the 
basis for his construing of the statute’s use of the term “personal 
privacy” and his application of it to corporations. This analytical 
approach is not surprising given both the Justices’ fundamental 
disagreement about the proper method of interpreting statutory 
language83 and Chief Justice Roberts’s fondness for “dictionaries, 
derivations, grammatical parsing, and fine points of usage.”84 
A.  Ordinary and Legal Usages 
 of “Person” and “Personal” 
Consequently, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to grapple mostly 
with whether the ordinary and legal usages of the words “person” 
and “personal” would justify extending Exemption 7(C)’s “personal 
privacy” protection to corporations, rather than the constitutional 
implications of doing so. During oral argument, the government 
argued that the word “personal,” standing alone, refers exclusively to 
human beings.85 Dictionaries, on the other hand, define “personal” 
more broadly, using slight variations of the following: “of, pertaining 
to, or coming as from a particular person.”86 
Despite Congress’s definition of the term “person” to include a 
corporation, AT&T was unable to persuade the Court that the term 
“personal” has its own legal meaning that is separate from its 
ordinary meaning. Moreover, AT&T provided no other support for 
its “grammatical imperative” beyond the 1896 Mercantile case, 
 
 83. Denniston, supra note 81. 
 84. Garrett Epps, Chief Justice John Roberts: Word Nerd, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2011, 
5:46 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/chief-justice-john-roberts-word-
nerd/71902/. Roberts “incessantly picked at the prose diction” of other officials and those who 
wrote to the president when he worked in the Reagan White House. Id. He once critiqued a letter 
from three District of Columbia officials as “reading as if it were an awkward translation from 
Bulgarian.” Id. 
 85. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 3. 
 86. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1307 (2010); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 1311 (4th ed. 2006); THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1982); 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1686 (1986). 
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which referred to a corporation’s “personal privilege.”87 Mercantile, 
however, was not dispositive because it did not define what it means 
for a corporation to have a “personal privilege” and because it only 
applied the term “personal privilege” narrowly in the context of an 
exemption to a federal tax statute.88 
B.  “Personal Privacy” as  
Applied to Corporations 
To prevail, AT&T had to persuade the Court that it could apply 
the larger idea of “personal privacy” as a whole to corporations. But 
AT&T again was unable to present any convincing evidence in 
support of this assertion; rather, it argued that nothing in the statute’s 
language shows that Exemption 7(C) was intended to exclude 
corporations.89 This was not an effective approach, according to legal 
analysts: “As the reader of the [FCC v. AT&T] opinion works 
through it, the document turns into a somewhat repetitive recitation 
of the theme that the notion of ‘personal privacy’ just does not seem 
to fit a corporation.”90 
This idea came up during the oral argument as well. The 
government argued that a corporation’s privacy is more often 
referred to as “confidentiality” or “secrecy.”91 Chief Justice Roberts 
attempted to rebut this argument by suggesting that a corporation 
does not have “confidential” or “secret” property, but rather “private 
property.”92 The government argued that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
examples were not situations that involved “privacy” that would fit 
into the statutory language of Exemption 7(C) or within the intent 
that Congress had when it adopted Exemption 7(C).93 
Once again, AT&T could not identify any instances in which a 
court or a statute has referred to a corporation’s personal privacy. 
This was likely because the idea that “personal privacy” rights do not 
apply to corporations was explicitly established even before 
Congress drafted Exemption 7(C). The Court noted that William 
 
 87. See Mercantile Bank v. Tenn. ex rel. Memphis, 161 U.S. 161, 171 (1896). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 34. 
 90. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A Word Game over “Privacy,” SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2011, 
12:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=114729. 
 91. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 10. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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Prosser wrote in his 1955 treatise that “[a] corporation . . . can have 
no personal privacy . . . .”94 The Court also pointed out that Prosser 
wrote in his later 1964 treatise that “it seems generally agreed that 
the right of privacy is one pertaining only to individuals, and that a 
corporation . . . cannot claim it as such.”95 In addition, the Court 
noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts—though it was written 
after Exemption 7(C) was drafted—stated that “[a] corporation . . . 
has no personal right of privacy.”96 Thus, the Court was unable to 
find any basis for AT&T’s argument that the “personal privacy” 
clause of Exemption 7(C) applies to corporations. While individuals’ 
privacy rights have generally increased since the publication of 
Prosser’s torts treatises, the Court found no proposition to suggest 
that a corporation’s “personal” rights have also expanded. 
C.  Exemption 7(C) Contrasted  
with Exemptions 4 and 6 
The Court’s unwillingness to justify “personal privacy” rights 
for corporations based on case law or Exemption 7(C) becomes even 
more clear when one contrasts Exemption 7(C) with FOIA’s other 
sections—in particular, Exemption 4 and Exemption 6. Exemption 6 
allows the withholding of “personnel and medical files,” the 
disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of “personal 
privacy.”97 Exemption 4 pertains to “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”98 
While the Court has not yet decided whether corporations are 
entitled to “personal privacy” rights under the Constitution, it could 
have inferred in this case that Exemption 6’s personal privacy 
protections apply only to individuals and only to protect an 
individual human’s right of privacy.99 Moreover, Congress did not 
use language in Exemption 7(C) that was similar to the language that 
it used in Exemption 4. This suggests that Exemption 4 specifically 
 
 94. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011) (emphasis added) (citing PROSSER, 
supra note 74, § 97, at 641–42). 
 95. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 843–44 (3d ed. 1964)). 
 96. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (1976)). 
 97. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006). 
 98. Id. § 552(b)(4). 
 99. See Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 175 (1991) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 
425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)); Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982). 
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addresses a corporation’s “personal privacy” concerns—which are 
related to its trade secrets and privileged or confidential 
information—while Congress enacted Exemption 7(C) to protect a 
human’s “personal privacy.” 
If it had compared Exemption 7(C) to Exemption 4, the Court 
also should have found that corporations do have “privileged or 
confidential” kinds of information rather than “personally private” 
information. Thus, at the time that Congress enacted 
Exemption 7(C), FOIA already contained an exemption in 
Exemption 4 that would have prevented the disclosure of a 
corporation’s proprietary commercial and financial information. The 
existence of Exemption 4 also shows that Congress most likely 
enacted Exemption 7(C) to protect natural persons and that the use of 
the term “person” cannot extend to corporations for the purposes of 
Exemption 7(C). 
Nonetheless, AT&T claimed in its oral argument that 
Exemption 4 may not be a sufficient shield to protect a corporation’s 
privileged information.100 For example, AT&T argued that 
Exemption 4 would not adequately safeguard negative e-mails 
between officers of a corporation about a would-be regulator or 
about an important customer101: Exemption 4 would allow the 
release of the damaging e-mails with the names of the parties 
redacted.102 AT&T maintained that this would be an instance where 
the communicating parties had an expectation of privacy that their e-
mails would not become public and harm their corporation.103 AT&T 
argued that corporations should benefit from Exemption 7(C)’s 
“personal privacy” protections in situations such as one in which 
they hope to prevent the release of their internal e-mails.104 Justice 
Scalia seemed unconvinced based on his questions at oral 
argument,105 and AT&T’s argument is especially hard to justify in 
today’s world, where electronic communications—even ones where 
 
 100. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 30–31; see also supra text accompanying 
note 24 (discussing Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information” from disclosure). 
 101. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 24–25. 
 102. Id. at 24. 
 103. Id. at 24–25. 
 104. Id. at 25. 
 105. Id. at 24 (questioning how the risk of possible embarrassment to a corporation relates to 
a corporation’s “privacy” interests). 
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there is an expectation of privacy—are becoming increasingly 
public. 
D.  Larger Constitutional Questions 
 and Legislative History 
Still, even after it heard these arguments in favor of personal 
privacy protections for corporations, the Court had some discretion 
to consider broader constitutional questions about the rights of 
corporations. But it avoided tackling any of the points that might 
show how a corporation is like a person in the privacy sense. The 
Justices cited Citizens United and the Third Circuit decision in this 
case, which held that corporations, like human beings, are capable of 
being publicly embarrassed, harassed, or stigmatized.106 The Court 
also did not look to FOIA’s general aims or consider how FOIA’s 
personal privacy protections could cover a corporation. FOIA’s 
overall goal is to provide disclosure except when an agency that 
seeks to withhold records can prove that nondisclosure would fall 
within the specific exemptions that Congress wrote into the law.107 
The Court could have at least considered whether disclosure was 
appropriate within the larger context of FOIA’s purpose. 
AT&T asserted that corporations have had privacy rights for 
decades, even rights similar to those that are typically reserved for 
natural persons.108 The Court even acknowledged that corporations 
can be like individuals in a way. Near the end of his opinion, Chief 
Justice Roberts reflected that he “trusts” that AT&T will not take the 
holding “personally.”109 In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to 
be suggesting, in direct contravention of his holding, that 
corporations do have “feelings” that can be hurt. 
Beyond this, other than considering the attorney general’s 1975 
memorandum110 regarding the newly enacted FOIA exemptions, the 
Court did not delve further into the legislative history of the Act. 
Justice Scalia noted during oral argument that the exceptions to 
FOIA should be narrowly construed, but the Court otherwise refused 
 
 106. Denniston, supra note 81. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011). 
 110. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 76. 
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to acknowledge either side’s argument about what the Act plainly 
means.111 
On the other hand, this oversight was likely because FOIA does 
not define “personal privacy,” so the Court’s best resource for its 
interpretation of the Act was the attorney general’s memorandum. In 
addition, as the attorney general prepared the memorandum for the 
purpose of explaining the new exemptions to executive departments 
and agencies,112 and because the memorandum so clearly stated that 
“personal privacy” pertains to individuals,113 the Court probably did 
not need to go any further into the legislative history. 
Furthermore, there is a “debate within the Court as to whether it 
is proper for the Justices to examine the drafting and legislative 
history of a statute it is interpreting,” which may also explain its 
decision to use the memorandum as the sole basis of its analysis of 
the legislative history.114 
In general, Chief Justice Roberts avoided the larger questions of 
policy or jurisprudence and did not even hint that he knew what—or 
who—the statute was meant to protect.115 If he had done any more 
analysis on this point, the Chief Justice may have opened the 
floodgates to many other issues that he did not want or need to 
address. After all, some Justices, such as Scalia, insist that the Court 
find the meaning of a federal statute in the law’s actual language, 
while others, like Breyer, think that evidence of Congress’s intent 
from debates and committee reports lends meaning to statutes.116 
E.  Citizens United and  
Other Ramifications 
Chief Justice Roberts also went out of his way to make clear that 
this statutory decision does not provide any guidance on how far the 
Court is willing to carry the Citizens United principle that 
corporations have free speech rights that are as extensive as those of 
individuals.117 He likely made this point because of the widespread 
negative reaction to the Citizens United decision, which included a 
 
 111. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 11. 
 112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 76. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Denniston, supra note 81. 
 115. Epps, supra note 84. 
 116. Denniston, supra note 81. 
 117. Epps, supra note 84. 
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public chastisement from President Obama.118 Then again, the Court 
often repeats its command that it should not decide constitutional 
issues unless it has no other alternative.119 However, there were 
plenty of language-based routes that the Court could have taken to 
reach its desired holding without having to tackle larger 
constitutional implications.120 
The Court also may have avoided the larger issue of corporate 
personhood because, even in Citizens United, the majority and 
dissent had different ideas about what a corporation is.121 The 
majority viewed the corporation as an “association of citizens,” while 
the dissent viewed corporations as more of a “creature of the 
state.”122 This disagreement does not provide a helpful basis for an 
analysis of whether the notion of personal privacy covers 
corporations. 
Despite rendering a thorough decision on the points that related 
to grammar and FOIA’s exemptions, the Court failed to consider 
some points that could have ramifications for FOIA’s future. The 
Court could have noted that “[c]orporations with a privacy interest 
under Exemption 7(C) could be more willing to participate in 
government investigations.”123 It also failed to note the possibility 
that the Third Circuit’s decision could hinder journalists’ ability to 
obtain information from the government.124 Furthermore, because 
this case was limited to Exemption 7(C) and did not state that 
corporations constitutionally do not have a personal privacy interest 
 
 118. Robert Barnes, In the Court of Public Opinion, No Clear Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 
2010, at A01; Denniston, supra note 81. Near the end of his January 2010 State of the Union 
address, President Obama said, “With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the 
Supreme Court reversed a century of law that, I believe, will open the floodgates for special 
interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in our elections.” President 
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
 119. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003, 
1004 (1994). The “last resort rule” mandates that a federal court abstain from ruling on a 
constitutional issue if the case can be resolved through a nonconstitutional basis. Id. 
 120. Denniston, supra note 81. 
 121. Stefan J. Padfield, Does the Freedom of Information Act’s Protection for “Personal 
Privacy” Protect the Privacy of Corporate Entities?, 38 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 156, 158 
(2011). 
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Corporations Lack Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemptions, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 481, 
508 (2011). 
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under another FOIA exemption, corporations are likely to find other 
ways to assert rights to personal privacy.125 This will remain a 
difficult area for the Court because the law on the one hand treats 
corporations as “persons” in a legal sense, but on the other hand 
recognizes that privacy remains a concept that makes the most sense 
in the context of individuals’ rights.126 Thus, even if the Court 
expands the “personhood” of corporations, it is likely to remain 
unwilling to recognize the same level of privacy protections for 
corporations as it recognizes for individuals.127 
V.  CONCLUSION 
By apparently limiting its holding in FCC v. AT&T to FOIA 
Exemption 7(C), the Court did not provide further clarification on 
the “personhood” of corporations or what constitutional rights 
corporations should enjoy. FCC v. AT&T provided only a thorough 
grammatical and statutory analysis of FOIA’s Exemption 7(C). And 
Chief Justice Roberts intentionally limited his opinion to the 
conclusion that corporations, though they are “persons” in a legal 
sense, do not have “personal privacy” rights based on the ordinary 
usage of that term. As a result, other cases that test the full extent of 
a corporation’s “personhood” are likely to follow. 
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